Do “Economic Progressives” Contribute More to the National Debt? A Preliminary Look

This essay was originally published in Christian Democracy Magazine and is based on an earlier blog post of mine. 

It is standard fare to depict the more economically progressive of the two parties dominating the American political system as big on government spending. It is because of the Democratic Party’s "fiscal irresponsibility", conservatives often argue, that our country is mired in debt. We can assume that this charge would be levelled more heavily against Christian democrats - hence why I think it is necessary to address such arguments (in other words, my interest in this short essay is not so much in defending the Democratic Party as it is in dispelling fears of “big government”). 

 The problem with this caricature is that Democrats are also portrayed as big on raising taxes. Since tax revenues and expenditures may, theoretically, cancel each other out, there's no prima facie reason to assume that Democrats contribute more to our national debt than Republicans. On the contrary, one might expect that the latter would add far more to our debt, given their supposed hostility towards taxes combined with their stronger support for military spending. 

So, who really contributes more to our debt - Democratic or Republican governments? I made an effort last year to answer this question. I measured Republican Party presence in government (by which I mean the presidency and Congress) for every year from 1948-2011, according to the simple framework illustrated in the table below. I then sought to determine whether a stronger Republican presence in government leads to lower annual debt increases (click here for data), and what I found might surprise those who peddle this "Democrats-are-more-fiscally-irresponsible" idea. 

As the graph to the bottom-left shows (click to enlarge), governments with a "strong" Republican presence (67-100%) have an average annual debt increase score of 7.47, 1 percentage point higher than governments with a "weak" Republican presence (0-33%). Further, the graph to the bottom-right reveals that "purely" Democratic governments - i.e., where the president and majorities of both houses are Democratic - have a slightly lower debt increase score than their Republican counterparts (4.92% versus 5.42%). 

In short, for both theoretical and empirical reasons, the notion that Democrats are significantly more debt-causing than Republicans appears baseless. We should not, therefore, fear the rise of a Christian democratic party - which would expectedly be more economically progressive than its Democratic counterpart - at least on the basis of its anticipated impact on the national debt.

National Referenda: A Solution for Christian Communitarians?

This essay was originally published in Ethika Politika.

Our political system doesn’t make it easy for an ideological Christian democrat to vote with a clear conscience.

We frequently feel that a vote for either the Democratic or Republican Party amounts to a compromise of core values.  All too often, it seems that our decision amounts to a choice between greater economic injustice and complicity in the continued legality of abortion.  Even those who recognize a clear distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable values (e.g., between economic justice and life) and, accordingly, vote for a Republican often feel a certain compunction in doing so.

My intention is not to disparage Democrats or Republicans—and I apologize in advance to anyone who takes offense to my comments—but simply to address, and present a possible remedy to, the problem that stems from the fact that Christian democrats hold to a distinct set of political values that no major party adequately embodies.

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When pursuing solutions to this dilemma, ideas involving changes to our electoral system or campaign finance laws normally come to mind.  While these are certainly avenues worth exploring, I want to focus my attention on a possible solution that doesn’t appear to have received much attention: national referenda, something that a majority of Americans favor.  I relate the lion’s share of my discussion to the specific issue of abortion.

What are some of the pros and cons of national referenda?

National referenda strike a balance between representative and direct democracy.  It is widely agreed that we need the former because most people have neither the time nor the interest to occupy themselves with daily political affairs, and prefer delegating this task to elected representatives.  Most believe that we also need the latter since some issues are of special importance to us, and if we were given an option, we would prefer not to entrust decisions over these sensitive matters to others.

Arguably, therefore, citizens must be able to directly legislate on issues that are exceptionally important to them.  Take abortion.  If this issue were wrested from party politics and put to a popular vote, the Christian democrat could (at least until the new American Solidarity Party, to which I belong, is firmly established) vote for a Democrat without troubling his conscience.  Indeed, referenda would arguably increase the likelihood of victories for the anti-abortion movement.  Public opinion analysis reveals that a plurality and nearly half of Americans regard abortion as morally wrong, and describe themselves as pro-life.

Whereas direct democracy may be a boon for the anti-abortion movement, it could also result in policies that conflict with Christian values.  To cite but one example, social conservatives will point to growing public support for the legalization of same-sex marriage (of course, one could always counter that referenda would simply expedite what appears inevitable anyway).

Referenda could also pose dangers to religious freedom, especially in an increasingly secular society that is at times hostile to Christianity.  This should serve as a reminder that the ultimate political end of the Christian democrat shouldn’t be democratization; rather, democracy is a means to an end that isn’t universally applicable across space and time (One shouldn’t conclude from this statement that Christian democrats are less committed to democracy than others.  After all, few people advocate for popular rule without harboring optimistic expectations of how the people will rule).

A tough road ahead

Of course, not everyone is totally enamored with the idea of introducing referenda to national politics.  Regarding the abortion issue, opponents of direct democracy might include Republicans, who benefit at the polls on account of their greater, at least ostensible opposition to abortion rights.  Even those social conservatives who embrace progressive economic values may feel compelled to vote Republican, due to the moral imperative to oppose abortion rights.  If abortion were to be restricted or banned—following a referendum, for instance—Republicans would find it more difficult to maintain this crucial part of their electoral base.  In other words, referenda could liberate many pro-lifers from GOP captivity, and Republicans would presumably do everything in their power to ensure that this doesn’t happen.  It’s probable that Democrats would, in spite of their party’s name, also oppose resolving the abortion issue in a directly democratic way, given the public’s stance on abortion (see above).

In short, advocates of national referenda appear to have a tough road ahead.  Whether this is a journey worth undertaking is certainly a matter of debate, and I hope I play a small part in bringing this debate to a national audience.

Should You Teach Religion to Your Kids?

This essay was published in Ethika Politika.

Today, many atheists (not all, to be fair) have expressed the view that it’s wrong for parents to instill their religious beliefs in their children.  Chillingly, Richard Dawkins seems to go so far as to imply that the law should restrict parents from doing so:  “Maybe some children need to be protected from indoctrination by their own parents.”  This particular subset of the atheist community is quick to acknowledge our right to practice a religion - even if they find it silly or usually oppressive - while questioning our right to pass it on to our children.  However, only atheists who oppose both rights (or neither right) are being logically consistent, as I explain below.

One of our basic duties as parents is to protect our children from danger. We strive to ensure – through force, if necessary – that our children don’t ingest harmful substances, unbuckle their seatbelts while the car is moving, or take candy from strangers.  Although it would certainly be nice to persuade them through reason, alone, to avoid such dangerous acts, we wouldn’t hesitate to enforce our rules against their will if they found our rationale unconvincing, and no sane person would accuse us of “indoctrinating” or “forcing our beliefs” on them while doing so.  I can’t imagine being congratulated for my “tolerance” if I were to say, “You know, it’s a pity that my child doesn’t agree that unbuckling his seatbelt while I’m driving is dangerous, but it is a free country. Perhaps if we get in a wreck, he will conclude that I was right (assuming, of course, that he survives the experience of being hurled through the windshield and is capable of reflecting on the experience).”

If we assume, just for the sake of argument, that what our religion teaches is true, then we will recognize that the danger of not passing it on to our children may be incomparably greater than not teaching them to avoid taking candy from strangers.  What Dawkins and like-minded atheists suggest would make sense only if we assumed from the outset that our religious beliefs are false (which, of course, they do).  However, they claim to tolerate our right to assume the contrary, without realizing (or at least hoping that we won’t realize) that they contradict themselves by denying our right to instill these beliefs in our children - which most, if not all, religions, naturally require us to do. 

Of course, if your child showed interest in other religious traditions or even questioned God’s existence, then attempting to suppress his curiosity may only add to the allure of heterodox ideas, as we’re often drawn to that which is forbidden.  But the religious parent who values such inquiry for its own sake, as if the outcome were immaterial to the child’s spiritual well-being, is better described as logically inconsistent than “open-minded” – he behaves no less absurdly than a parent who encourages his child to seek a second opinion on whether it’s okay to accept candy from a stranger. 

It’s also worth addressing the claim that the very act of teaching religion to our children evidences our own uncertainty about what we believe. “If you’re so sure that your religion is true,” I’ve heard it asked, “then why bother teaching it to your children? Shouldn't reason, alone, enlighten them to the truth of your religion?”  This view betrays an unduly high level of faith in one’s ability to reason his way to truth.  Even the smartest of us have been convinced to do moronic things. It also assumes that there’s nothing at stake in whether or not a child chooses to embrace his parents’ religion.  This argument, as well, rests on the a priori assumption that religious beliefs are nonsense.  Once this assumption is discarded, it should be clear enough that the desire to transmit our faith to our children has nothing to do with  religious doubt, but is rather an expression of our concern for their entire well-being.

In the final analysis, the only religion these particular atheists claim to tolerate is, in fact, a secular worldview that usurps the name of one’s religion.  Let’s not be fooled. 

New Article - Are Highly Theistic Countries Dumber?

Excellent news – a manuscript of mine regarding the supposed impact of IQ on belief in God has just been accepted for publication in the Catholic Social Science Review!  See below for the abstract.

Are Highly Theistic Countries Dumber?  Critiquing the Intelligence-Religiosity Nexus Theory

Abstract

Recent research suggests that higher-IQ countries have significantly more atheists, supposedly because higher intelligence confers a greater ability to apprehend the assumed irrationality of theistic belief. In this quantitative study, an alternative explanation is offered to explain the apparent relationship between intelligence and theism. It is theorized that higher education in free societies brings greater exposure to, and eases the acceptance of, such unconventional views as atheism. This exposure, in and of itself, augments the likelihood that one will reject belief in God. In addition, it is argued on the basis of the Christian ascetic tradition that materialism also produces higher levels of disbelief. OLS regression analysis of 99 countries confirms both theories, while revealing no evidence of an inverse link between intelligence and theism. Findings also show that disbelief is significantly lower in countries that are traditionally Roman Catholic, as well as in those that have not experienced communist rule.

Reflections on Democracy & Ethnic Diversity in Iran

This article of mine was originally published last year in Muftah.org: A Mideast and North Africa Foreign Policy Magazine.

Since last December, when mass anti-government protests began in Tunisia and ultimately lead to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, a revolutionary tide has swept across much of the Middle East and North Africa. Two months later, on February 11, 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was similarly pressured to leave office, after ruling Egypt for nearly 30 years. Many observers have rejoiced in these developments and are hopeful that Iran, amongst other countries in the region, will follow in the footsteps of its North African counterparts.

In my opinion, however, democracy brings with itself new dangers of which many have not been sufficiently mindful. It is no exaggeration to describe Iran as an extremely heterogeneous country (in fact, using a conventional measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, I have estimated that Iran is more than twice as fractionalized as the average Arab League country). It is home to numerous ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, some members of whom have taken up arms in their fight for self-determination.

If Iran were to democratize, how will it impact peace and stability in such a uniquely diverse country? Would democratization satisfy the political demands of the various ethno-nationalist groups operating within the country’s periphery? Or, would it encourage the formation of ethnic political parties with the electoral incentive to politicize communal differences, exacerbating ethnic tensions even further? Would Iran be torn asunder by a balkanization reminiscent of Yugoslavia’s bloody disintegration?

Although it is difficult if not impossible to offer definitive answers to these questions, it remains important to draw attention to these timely issues and to suggest ways in which they may be addressed.

A History of Ethnic Tension

To be sure, one must take care not to overstate the extent of disunity in Iran. The country’s largest ethnic group – i.e., the Persians – comprise between 51-65 percent of the total population, and yet over 90 percent of Iran, in both 2000 and 2005, expressed pride in being Iranian. It appears, therefore, that large numbers of non-Persians share in this national pride, refusing to see the Iranian state as merely the political expression of Persian ethnicity.

Nevertheless, several ethnic minority groups within the country, including the Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis and Kurds, have been described as presenting multiple risk factors for rebellion, such as being territorially concentrated and having suffered various forms of government repression. Of course, revolts of this sort have materialized on numerous occasions throughout Iran’s history, and instances of alleged ethno-nationalist terrorism abound. From statistics provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute (Oslo), one discovers that ethno-nationalist groups have engaged in armed conflicts with Iranian security forces in as frequently a 1/3 of the years for which data is available. Periodic skirmishes (particularly in Iranian-Kurdistan) continue to occur.

Using figures from the Global Terrorism Database, I observed that there were at least 68 alleged terrorist incidents committed during the years 1979-2008 by ethno-nationalist organizations in Iran, resulting in 127 fatalities (although the actual number is likely higher, given that many attacks for which no organization claimed responsibility occurred in ethnic minority regions). As recently as last December, 30 people were killed in the Iranian city of Chabahar by a suicide bomber belonging to the Baluchistan-based Jundullah organization, whose stated objective is to protect the rights of Sunni Muslims and ethnic Baluchis. As an aside, the regions for which these organizations are seeking greater autonomy or independence are amongst Iran’s most impoverished. These regional disparities, which were noted in a 1999 UN human development report that found Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan to have the lowest levels of human development, appear to persist and their likely link to political violence in these regions should not go unnoted.

Is Decentralization the Answer?

One solution to Iran’s ethnic problems, many have argued, is to transfer political power to the country’s various regions. As the argument goes, justice seems to demand that minority peoples be given greater control over their own economic, social and cultural affairs. It may also appear politically expedient to do so, as such a move would reduce separatist tendencies and thereby contribute to peace and stability.

Despite these arguments, however, decentralization occasionally produces the opposite effects, as well. A 2006 study published in International Organization demonstrated that decentralization increases or decreases ethnic conflict and secession, depending upon the strength of ethno-regional political parties. According to the author, Dawn Brancati, “regional parties intensify ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that causes certain groups to feel threatened in a country, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism or supporting terrorist organizations that participate in these activities.” Brancati goes on to suggest ways in which governments can regulate the strength of such regional parties, so that decentralization will not yield such adverse effects. My own suggestion – not necessarily in contradiction to Brancati’s – is to adopt a global approach, as I explain below.

Towards an International Convention on Secession

Presumably, most states do not repress minority rights for its own sake, but rather do so out of fear that political stability or territorial integrity might otherwise be compromised. While it may be an idealistic proposal, there is much reason to believe that international law on self-determination could go far in allaying these fears, particularly in the form of an international convention that permits secession (as the ultimate expression of self-determination) only under explicitly narrow conditions. Under this framework, as long as the state respects the cultural, economic and other human rights of its peoples, its territorial integrity would be guaranteed based on the convention’s unequivocal rejection of secession without just cause. Otherwise, those charged with adjudicating this treaty (e.g., a panel of judges akin to those of the International Court of Justice) could vote to recognize the independence of an aggrieved people, should the group opt for secession.

This treaty-based solution involves costs and benefits to both states and minority groups, although a strong case can be made that, for each party, the benefits more than compensate for the costs. Beginning with the state, while it may be ceding a good measure of sovereignty to an international body (a particularly unpalatable circumstance for many countries if an institution like the UN Security, dominated as it arguably is by the Great Powers, were authorized to enforce the convention), it must be recognized that, whether or not it chooses to sign such a convention, the state (and this is particularly true of states with a diverse ethnic makeup) will likely have to confront secessionist challenges at some point. In this situation, it would be to the advantage of the state to accede to a convention that would establish procedures by which these centrifugal impulses would be channeled in more peaceful directions, while also serving as a form of “sovereignty insurance” in two ways. First, such a convention would arguably permit states to devolve power without fearing that decentralization would ultimately degenerate into secessionism. Second, the convention may deter foreign states from destabilizing other countries by encouraging (overtly or otherwise) secessionist movements, or from unilaterally recognizing the independence of breakaway regions.

As for minority groups, it is true that the convention would effectively close the door to independence, unless the state is found to be in violation of its terms. After all, supposing most or all states sign and comply with the treaty, secessionist regions would be diplomatically isolated and denied membership in such key international organizations as the UN. On the other hand, these groups may stand a better chance of enjoying greater autonomy under the convention, given that it places firm obligations on states to respect the fundamental rights of their peoples.

Conclusion

While we must be cognizant of the potential dangers that attend democratization and work both domestically and internationally to design institutions to mitigate these dangers, these suggestions are not in any way intended to imply that Iranians do not deserve democratic rights. At the same time, there are certainly a number of critical questions (e.g., what if a state fails to respect the decision of the convention’s enforcement body to recognize the independence of a breakaway region? How might this convention undermine the UN General Assembly’s power in accrediting new UN members?) raised by this proposal that remain unanswered, and that will hopefully be the subject of future debate and critical analysis.

Support Our Troops...Until They Come Home?

Published in the Summer 2009 issue of New Politics.

Hardline conservatives have traditionally sought to vest monopoly control over patriotism in the Republican Party. In contrast, they frequently castigate Democrats and liberals in general as traitors. As Ann Coulter claims, liberals have a “preternatural gift for always striking a position on the side of treason.”

These hardliners have employed a number of tactics in their effort to monopolize patriotism. One of the more recent of these is the use of the popular “Support our troops” slogan, in which they have attempted to convince Americans that opposing the war is somehow equivalent to opposing our troops. Noam Chomsky attests to the propagandistic value of such catchphrases:

The point of public relation slogans like "Support our troops" is that they don’t mean anything. They mean as much as whether you support the people in Iowa…The issue [is], Do you support our policy? But you don’t want people to think about that issue. That’s the whole point of good propaganda. You want to create a slogan that nobody’s going to be against, and everybody’s going to be for (Media Control, 2nd ed., p. 26).

Are liberals really anti-American? Do they truly wish our troops harm? One can infer an answer to this question from the 2008 Congressional Report Card, published by the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America (IAVA) Action Fund. The Report Card assesses the extent to which members of Congress have endorsed pro-veteran legislation relating to an “entire range of issues…including veterans' health care, the new GI Bill, mental health, and support for homeless veterans.”

To be clear, IAVA is a non-partisan group. To the best of my knowledge, the 2008 Report Card does not list party affiliations of legislators next to their scores. Anticipating the accusation of partisanship, IAVA points out that “the methodology behind the report card is completely transparent – those who voted with veterans scored well, those who did not support our veterans did not.” They note, further, that “both parties did very well” overall.

That said, there is a strong correlation of over 70% between party affiliation and one’s total score in both houses (the figures below display average scores for Democrats and Republicans). Specifically, Democrats are associated with higher support for pro-veteran legislation. This relationship is statistically significant at below the .01 level, which in laymen’s terms means that there is less than a 1% chance that this relationship is simply coincidental (please feel free to contact me if you'd like to obtain my data).

Maybe it is worthwhile to inquire on the grades our presidential candidates received. Perhaps to the surprise of those who support John McCain (himself a veteran), the senator got a D, whereas Barack Obama got a B (which is also quite low, at least in comparison to the many who got perfect As).

In short, it appears that many are eager to send our men and women in uniform to war and yet turn their backs on them once they return. This invites the impression that our troops are regarded less as freedom defenders, and more as impersonal, expendable resources like money. That’s hardly patriotic.