Independence in Catalonia

Yesterday's independence vote in Catalonia was a total sham. The fact that the referendum was illegal ensured that many would-be voters would avoid polling stations for fear of government repression, and that many anti-independence Catalans would choose to boycott what they believed to be an illegitimate referendum. We didn't need news reports like this to validate these expectations.

Also note results from a survey conducted just two months ago: most Catalans (almost half) opposed independence, and by a wide margin. Yesterday's results very likely do not reflect the will of the people.

Interview with a Secessionist: Dennis Steele on the Vermont Independence Movement

Below is an interview with Dennis Steele, who competed in Vermont’s 2010 gubernatorial election under an explicitly secessionist platform. He is a member of the Second Vermont Republic, an ideologically diverse organization seeking to return Vermont to its original status as an independent republic. Steele is also quite the entrepreneur: he is the owner of Online Chess LLC, a free online chess-playing community, Museter, which provides audio SHOUTcast streaming hosting services, and Radio Free Vermont, which broadcasts Vermont-made music.

Please briefly explain why you believe that Vermont ought to secede from the United States.

Survival.

While most Americans seemingly agree that their political system is fundamentally flawed, they seek to reform it, not break it apart. Why is secession the best (or only) solution?

We all try to reform it. In fact, I am involved in Ron Paul's campaign trying to reform it. However, the reality is that the system will need to be drastically changed in order to get the change we are looking for. Most people are still hanging on by a thread making ends meet. When this starts to break down and food prices rise, with the coming inflation, they will begin to see things differently. They will want more control over their local lives. If the feds push against this change... well then, Atlas will Shrug, to use Ayn Rand's book as an analogy.

It would seem that secession has not caught on since 2007, when it was found in an oft-noted poll that 13% of Vermonters supported independence. Why is that?

This really has to do with the ignorant people in Vermont voting for Obama. Let's face it: Obama has not changed anything. I grew up in Vermont and at the age of 17 I joined the army. When I came back I had this sort of utopian view of Vermont... we were different than most other places. We are the Shire. After coming back here to live after being gone for 20 years it is really sad to realize that Vermont really is not different. Instead we are like all the rest now. We are bought off with fiat money coming from Washington. Vermont has a very solid liberal democratic base and they did not like Bush and his wars. So, in 2007, yes - there was more support for secession. Once Obama was elected they seemed to think he was going to change the world. Most of the liberals now defend him no matter what he does. It is really very sad.

Vermont is the weak link in the empire. It only takes 500 signatures to run for Governor, 100 signatures to run for state senate and only 50 signatures to run for representative. We really have the opportunity to wag the dog but we keep getting fiat money handed to us. When this ends Vermont will get a wake-up call.

With all of the hand outs and special programs from the government we get to live in a bubble, so to speak. Fiat money has really given us the pleasure of living up in the sticks without having to deal with the harsh realities of surviving up here. It really is like having our cake and eating it too. The reality is Vermont and other pockets in the U.S. with small farming communities will do very well when the dollar crashes. However, because it is human nature to resist change until it is staring you in the face, we will be very weak for some time. But after the transition period Vermont will do just fine and the feds should, by that time, be very weak and easy to push off our backs.

The people in this movement are the forward thinkers. We can feel this change coming. We are ridiculed for our beliefs. But really we are the truth tellers and all societies need people like us.

Are there talks of forming a political party for the purpose of advocating for secession through electoral means? Would this be a good idea?

…the system does not like third party or independent candidates. They are isolated and left out of almost all debates. The system is fixed. I think the most important lesson was to realize that democracy does not exist anymore. The choice of freedom has become the choice between Coke and Pepsi.

How do you picture the future of the Vermont secessionist movement? Do you plan to remain involved? If so, in what capacity?

I am going to take more of a back seat approach right now. I saw myself as giving the movement a bit of a jolt to try and get it going. I think I did this very well given the odds I was up against. More people now are aware of our movement and I think we will continue to grow. It really is the only place for people to go once they realize what is going on.

There are many things unfolding now and people are more awake now than ever before. The important point is we are here and when more people wake up from their stupefied slumber of being drugged by the Keynesian economic system... which is in a major bubble right now...they will be looking for some place to go and we will welcome them with open arms.

Reflections on Democracy & Ethnic Diversity in Iran

This article of mine was originally published last year in Muftah.org: A Mideast and North Africa Foreign Policy Magazine.

Since last December, when mass anti-government protests began in Tunisia and ultimately lead to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, a revolutionary tide has swept across much of the Middle East and North Africa. Two months later, on February 11, 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was similarly pressured to leave office, after ruling Egypt for nearly 30 years. Many observers have rejoiced in these developments and are hopeful that Iran, amongst other countries in the region, will follow in the footsteps of its North African counterparts.

In my opinion, however, democracy brings with itself new dangers of which many have not been sufficiently mindful. It is no exaggeration to describe Iran as an extremely heterogeneous country (in fact, using a conventional measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, I have estimated that Iran is more than twice as fractionalized as the average Arab League country). It is home to numerous ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, some members of whom have taken up arms in their fight for self-determination.

If Iran were to democratize, how will it impact peace and stability in such a uniquely diverse country? Would democratization satisfy the political demands of the various ethno-nationalist groups operating within the country’s periphery? Or, would it encourage the formation of ethnic political parties with the electoral incentive to politicize communal differences, exacerbating ethnic tensions even further? Would Iran be torn asunder by a balkanization reminiscent of Yugoslavia’s bloody disintegration?

Although it is difficult if not impossible to offer definitive answers to these questions, it remains important to draw attention to these timely issues and to suggest ways in which they may be addressed.

A History of Ethnic Tension

To be sure, one must take care not to overstate the extent of disunity in Iran. The country’s largest ethnic group – i.e., the Persians – comprise between 51-65 percent of the total population, and yet over 90 percent of Iran, in both 2000 and 2005, expressed pride in being Iranian. It appears, therefore, that large numbers of non-Persians share in this national pride, refusing to see the Iranian state as merely the political expression of Persian ethnicity.

Nevertheless, several ethnic minority groups within the country, including the Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis and Kurds, have been described as presenting multiple risk factors for rebellion, such as being territorially concentrated and having suffered various forms of government repression. Of course, revolts of this sort have materialized on numerous occasions throughout Iran’s history, and instances of alleged ethno-nationalist terrorism abound. From statistics provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute (Oslo), one discovers that ethno-nationalist groups have engaged in armed conflicts with Iranian security forces in as frequently a 1/3 of the years for which data is available. Periodic skirmishes (particularly in Iranian-Kurdistan) continue to occur.

Using figures from the Global Terrorism Database, I observed that there were at least 68 alleged terrorist incidents committed during the years 1979-2008 by ethno-nationalist organizations in Iran, resulting in 127 fatalities (although the actual number is likely higher, given that many attacks for which no organization claimed responsibility occurred in ethnic minority regions). As recently as last December, 30 people were killed in the Iranian city of Chabahar by a suicide bomber belonging to the Baluchistan-based Jundullah organization, whose stated objective is to protect the rights of Sunni Muslims and ethnic Baluchis. As an aside, the regions for which these organizations are seeking greater autonomy or independence are amongst Iran’s most impoverished. These regional disparities, which were noted in a 1999 UN human development report that found Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan to have the lowest levels of human development, appear to persist and their likely link to political violence in these regions should not go unnoted.

Is Decentralization the Answer?

One solution to Iran’s ethnic problems, many have argued, is to transfer political power to the country’s various regions. As the argument goes, justice seems to demand that minority peoples be given greater control over their own economic, social and cultural affairs. It may also appear politically expedient to do so, as such a move would reduce separatist tendencies and thereby contribute to peace and stability.

Despite these arguments, however, decentralization occasionally produces the opposite effects, as well. A 2006 study published in International Organization demonstrated that decentralization increases or decreases ethnic conflict and secession, depending upon the strength of ethno-regional political parties. According to the author, Dawn Brancati, “regional parties intensify ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that causes certain groups to feel threatened in a country, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism or supporting terrorist organizations that participate in these activities.” Brancati goes on to suggest ways in which governments can regulate the strength of such regional parties, so that decentralization will not yield such adverse effects. My own suggestion – not necessarily in contradiction to Brancati’s – is to adopt a global approach, as I explain below.

Towards an International Convention on Secession

Presumably, most states do not repress minority rights for its own sake, but rather do so out of fear that political stability or territorial integrity might otherwise be compromised. While it may be an idealistic proposal, there is much reason to believe that international law on self-determination could go far in allaying these fears, particularly in the form of an international convention that permits secession (as the ultimate expression of self-determination) only under explicitly narrow conditions. Under this framework, as long as the state respects the cultural, economic and other human rights of its peoples, its territorial integrity would be guaranteed based on the convention’s unequivocal rejection of secession without just cause. Otherwise, those charged with adjudicating this treaty (e.g., a panel of judges akin to those of the International Court of Justice) could vote to recognize the independence of an aggrieved people, should the group opt for secession.

This treaty-based solution involves costs and benefits to both states and minority groups, although a strong case can be made that, for each party, the benefits more than compensate for the costs. Beginning with the state, while it may be ceding a good measure of sovereignty to an international body (a particularly unpalatable circumstance for many countries if an institution like the UN Security, dominated as it arguably is by the Great Powers, were authorized to enforce the convention), it must be recognized that, whether or not it chooses to sign such a convention, the state (and this is particularly true of states with a diverse ethnic makeup) will likely have to confront secessionist challenges at some point. In this situation, it would be to the advantage of the state to accede to a convention that would establish procedures by which these centrifugal impulses would be channeled in more peaceful directions, while also serving as a form of “sovereignty insurance” in two ways. First, such a convention would arguably permit states to devolve power without fearing that decentralization would ultimately degenerate into secessionism. Second, the convention may deter foreign states from destabilizing other countries by encouraging (overtly or otherwise) secessionist movements, or from unilaterally recognizing the independence of breakaway regions.

As for minority groups, it is true that the convention would effectively close the door to independence, unless the state is found to be in violation of its terms. After all, supposing most or all states sign and comply with the treaty, secessionist regions would be diplomatically isolated and denied membership in such key international organizations as the UN. On the other hand, these groups may stand a better chance of enjoying greater autonomy under the convention, given that it places firm obligations on states to respect the fundamental rights of their peoples.

Conclusion

While we must be cognizant of the potential dangers that attend democratization and work both domestically and internationally to design institutions to mitigate these dangers, these suggestions are not in any way intended to imply that Iranians do not deserve democratic rights. At the same time, there are certainly a number of critical questions (e.g., what if a state fails to respect the decision of the convention’s enforcement body to recognize the independence of a breakaway region? How might this convention undermine the UN General Assembly’s power in accrediting new UN members?) raised by this proposal that remain unanswered, and that will hopefully be the subject of future debate and critical analysis.